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Constitutionalism and Cultural Identity as revolutionary concepts in German political radicalism 
1806-1819: the case of the Burschenschaftler Karl Follen 
 
Maike Oergel 
The aim of this essay is to investigate the concepts of cultural identity and national sovereignty as 
they emerge in radical German nationalism after 1806 in relation to French Revolutionary ideas and 
seek to reconstruct a radical revolutionary, i.e. a ‘French Revolution’, context for the idea of German 
national unity. Such a ‘French Revolution’ context differs from attempts to create national unity 
‘from above’, it also questions the view that the ‘Teutomania’ emerging in the context of the Wars of 
Liberation can only be interpreted as the precursor to chauvinist German nationalism of later 
periods. 
The investigation will focus on a specific example: the political ideas, and militancy, of 
Burschenschaftler Karl Follen (1796-1840) as they found expression in his conception of student 
organisations, the outline of the all-German constitution he co-authored with this brother August, 
and his martial poetry. The investigation delineates the overlap between the French republican 
(Montagnard) constitution of June 1793and the Follen outline, as well as the differences between 
the two. It asks whether these differences may be due to the German need for imaginative nation-
building under conditions perceived as cultural and political oppression. The idea that the 
differences between the two constitutions, which in the main relate to a greater focus on cultural 
specificity in the German constitution, could be due to an acute sense of oppression rather than 
superiority, is based on the pronounced similarity between Follen’s approach to national liberation 
and that of Frantz Fanon over a century later. Both Follen and Fanon insist that an historically 
developed cultural identity and uncompromising militancy are necessary for national liberation, i.e. 
for a liberation of the people, to succeed.   
In Germany, as in many places in Europe, the French Revolution gave a new intensity to debates 
about appropriate and just forms of government. Over its course the Revolution, and the succeeding 
Napoleonic period, produced a continuum of political responses, from radical politics via reformist 
(moderate) politics to reactionary politics. A distinct phase of public, private, and secret debates 
about the future political shape of Germany began after Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia in 1806, which 
marked the beginning of Napoleon’s hegemony in Europe. The contributions to these debates 
engage with concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘state’ and range from Fichte’s impassioned public lectures in 
1807-08 calling for a national education programme to protect German, and human as he saw it, 
cultural and spiritual achievements , to Friedrich Ludwig Jahn’s and Karl Friedrich Friesen’s secret 
outline for an Ordnung und Einrichtung des deutschen Burschenwesens (1811),1 a plan to organise 
university students into a political and eventually military national opposition against French 
occupation and political control from (newly) Imperial France. Jahn extended this mobilisation 
beyond university students to a wider social mix of young men through his gymnastics movement, 
the Turnbewegung, which started its public activities in June 1811 and was intended to further moral 
and physical education as well as contribute to paramilitary training for national liberation. These 
activities paved the way for a well organised levée en masse against Napoleon’s forces, which 
contributed to the success of the Wars of Liberation 1813-14. The reorganisation of student 
associations and the setting up of the Turnbewegung was largely a call to arms to liberate the 
German territories from the ‘Franzonenherrschaft’ (rule of the French). Crucially in this context, it 
                                                          
1 Cf. Maike Oergel, ‘Revolutionaries, Traditionalists, Terrorists? The Burschenschaften and the German 
Counter-Cultural Tradition’, in Counter-Cultures in Germany and Central Europe. From Sturm und Drang to 
Baader-Meinhof, edited by Steve Giles and Maike Oergel (Bern: Peter Lang, 2003), pp. 61-86 (p. 65). 
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was animated by a desire for broad political enfranchisement and constitutional government in a 
united German state. 
After 1806 French dominance, political and military, was perceived as such a threat that it united, at 
least for a short while, an unlikely coalition: absolutist princes, moderate liberal constitutionalists 
and radical democratic republicans would work together organising a German resistance movement 
and generating the anti-Napoleonic propaganda for a war of liberation. However, the differences 
between them, i.e. between aiming to restore absolutist monarchical rule in relatively autonomous 
German principalities versus creating constitutional governance for a unified nation state, reasserted 
themselves immediately once Napoleon was defeated. This coalition fractured between the summer 
of 1815 (the conclusion of the Congress of Vienna and the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo) and 
the student congress of the Wartburgfest in October 1817. It turned into open enmity from 1819-20, 
when the repressive Carlsbad Decrees, following the murder of the diplomat and writer August von 
Kotzebue, outlawed all liberal or national activities that aimed at establishing constitutional 
government and national unity, describing them as Jacobin, revolutionary and treasonous. Kotzebue 
had been killed by the Burschenschaftler Karl Ludwig Sand who perceived Kotzebue as a 
representative of the new conservative repression. 
The political fault lines re-emerged as disillusionment with the process of instituting constitutional 
government was taking hold in liberal circles. Hopes for this had fuelled the Wars of Liberation, and 
constitutions were, albeit ambiguously, guaranteed by article 13 of the Bundesakte of June 1815, the 
founding document of the German Federation, negotiated at Vienna. Article 13 promised the (re-
)introduction of ‘landständische Verfassungen’, estate-based constitutions,2 in all states of the 
Federation, which would, to some extent, limit the absolutist power of the prince. 
Constitutions were being introduced in Sachsen-Weimar, south-western states and Bavaria, but 
importantly the two major powers Prussian and Austria made little headway in this direction. The 
notion of estate-based constitutions was itself contentious: for many committed liberals and all 
hard-line democrats it did not go far enough towards inaugurating fully representative government 
because it left feudal and corporate structures in place. Post-Napoleonic political agitation, which 
prioritised constitutional national unity rather than anti-French sentiment against French 
oppression, started in the course of 1814, and increased throughout the following year as 
disappointment about the lack of constitutional commitment at Vienna let a more radical political 
wing emerge in liberal circles. The most radical groupings included the Turner and the new student 
associations, the Burschenschaften. 
While the gymnastics movement was operating before the decisive Battle of Leipzig (1813), the 
Burschenschaft movement did not make an impact until the summer of 1815. Like the 
Turnbewegung, it was aimed at young, (fairly) educated males, their moral and political education, 
and the creation of a constitutional and united German Freistaat. Both Karl Follen and his brother 
August were committed Turner, they were founding figures of the Burschenschaft at Gießen 
University where they studied, and both had been teenage volunteers in an 1814 campaign of the 
Wars of Liberation (although they saw no action).3 
Post-1806 German political agitation is inextricably bound up with modern German nationalism; and 
(this) German nationalism grows out of anti-Napoleonic, and by extension, anti-French, sentiment. 
                                                          
2 The difficulty of translating ‘landständische Verfassung’ is well recognised; the term refers to representation 
through the traditional estates (including nobility, property-owners, the clergy, guilds and corporations etc). 
Assemblies made up of traditional estates have a long history in European politics. I will refer to 
‘landständische Verfassung’ as ‘estate-based constitution.’ 
3 Frank Mehring, Karl Follen. Deutsch-Amerikanischer Freiheitskämpfer (Gießen: Ferbersche 
Universtätsbuchhandlung, 2004), p. 31. 
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The reasons for this lie in the contemporary military and political landscape: the French armies were 
occupying German territories and Napoleon was creating client states organised in the 
Confederation of the Rhine, which was to be ‘under his protection’, i.e. beholden to him. While the 
French were frequently still greeted as liberators by the lower classes, the reality of occupation 
meant requisitioning at the least, which strained relations and created an experience of perceived 
oppression. Anti-French sentiment also built on cultural foundations, i.e. on over a generation’s 
worth of cultural differentiation which, in line with European Romantic ideas, had since the Sturm 
und Drang set German culture against French neo-classicism, and was developing notions of the 
differences between Romance and Germanic languages (while, it should be noted, at the same time 
creating a vision of a shared European heritage). Post-Napoleonic political agitation builds on this 
sense of national identity but foregrounds the entitlement of the people, as a nation, to political 
representation. Such entitlement was already present in the 1806-13 (anti-Napoleonic rather than 
post-Napoleonic) agitation, e.g. in Ernst Moritz Arndt’s Geist der Zeit, a running commentary on 
social and political developments. But while up to 1813-14 such calls for enfranchisement were 
always coupled with anti-French sentiments aimed against French ‘oppression’, after 1815 the anger 
was directed at illiberal German princes and their governments. 
My aim here is threefold: first, to show, through a concrete and specific example, that despite the 
context outlined above key ideas of the French Revolution remained crucial to radical political 
thinking in Germany;4 second, to point out how these ideas changed on their journey into German 
thinking; and third, to suggest, tentatively,  reasons for these changes. In this respect the essay is a 
contribution to the transfer of political ideas against a specific historical and cultural background. 
The common ground between French revolutionary ideas and German radical political thought is 
their rejection of absolutist monarchy and hereditary aristocracy. This rejection distinguishes 
German radical political thinking from German reformist political thinking. Both support 
constitutional participatory politics, but reformist thinking tends to advocate constitutional 
monarchy, i.e. intends co-operation with the princes, and is not necessarily opposed to a loosely 
federal Germany, i.e. national unification is not necessarily a prerequisite for constitutional success. 
This reformist thinking is often associated with the idea of ‘revolution from above’, although it was 
supported by the moderate elements from below; it represents the remnants of the pre-1813 
‘coalition’. Radical political thinking, on the other hand, tends to reject, along with monarchy, feudal 
absolutism and territorial division; it is not just republican, but democratic and demands national 
unity. It aims at constitutional settlement(s), i.e. participatory politics based on constitutionally 
guaranteed rights under the rule of law, for all German territories. The differences between radical 
and reformist thinking focus on the extent of the franchise and, crucially, on the seat of sovereignty. 
Who was the sovereign? The ruler, the (limited) electorate, or the entirety of the people? This 
difference becomes particularly evident in the debates between 1815 and 1819 about the type of 
constitution that was intended, or possible, under article 13: could estate-based constitutions also 
include a fully representative version based on popular sovereignty, in which the sovereign is 
defined as the people?5 This leads to follow-on questions regarding the division of powers: where 
                                                          
4 This is not a new idea, especially for the student movement; cf. Friedrich Meinecke, ‘Zur Geschichte des 
Hoffmannschen Bundes’, in Quellen und Darstellungen zur Geschichte der Burschenschaft und der deutschen 
Einheitsbewegung, edited by Hermann Haupt, vol 1, 2nd edition (Heidelberg: Winter, 1966), pp. 4-17 (pp. 5-6), 
Günther Steiger, Aufbruch. Urburschenschaft und Wartburgfest (Leipzig: Urania Verlag, 1967), Walter Grab, Ein 
Volk muß sich seine Freiheit selbst erobern. Zur Geschichte der deutschen Jakobiner (Frankfurt am Main: 
Büchergilde Gutenberg, 1984), pp. 498-503. 
5 For a debate about ‘landständische Verfassungen’, cf. Eberhard Büssem, Die Karlsbader Beschlüsse von 1819: 
Die endgültige Stabilisierung der restaurativen Politik im Deutschen Bund nach dem Wiener Kongreß 
(Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1974), pp. 156-164. 
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does the power of decision-making sit? Is it invested in the ruler or in the assembly of 
representatives? 
The Jena Burschenschaft was founded in June 1815; it is traditionally recognised as the first of the 
new type of student organisation.6 Student organisations, in the form of Landsmannschaften (having 
regionally coherent membership), have a long history, as did infamously dissolute student 
behaviour, in terms of sexual licence, excessive drinking and disrespect for authority. The new 
organisation aimed at reform in all these aspects, except respect for (repressive) external authority. 
It sought to create a student ethos that prepared university graduates to be members of a 
responsible national elite imbued with a sense of public spirit and committed to (male) equality. In 
its political aims it represented the key demands of bourgeois emancipation: the rule of 
constitutional law, representation, and a free public sphere, i.e. freedom of the press, opinion, and 
expression. The Jena Burschenschaft was egalitarian (all members are equal in rank and rights) and 
the organisation had democratic structures: its constitution was voted on, its executive officers were 
elected. Within the University it demanded the freedom of association and of opinion. But not 
everybody was allowed to join (fully): non-Christians and non-Germans tended to be excluded 
(which would not be entirely the case at Gießen, see below). The Jena Burschenschaft was 
committed to national unity, which would underpin the representative, constitutional, democratic 
structures of the new nation state. To symbolise this prospective national unity it set out to replace 
the traditional regional Landsmannschaften. Follen moved from Gießen to Jena in the autumn of 
1818, when he no longer had a professional future at Gießen following a high-profile legal success 
on behalf a number of Hessian parishes. Follen had represented the parishes who brought a case 
against arbitrary new princely laws, which were intended to deprive them, already crippled 
financially by the costs of the wars of liberation, of some of their political independence and some of 
their lands. Follen proceeded to defeat their princely opponents legally and in the public sphere by 
mounting a successful media campaign. Grudgingly the new laws were revoked.7 
At the same time as the Jena Burschenschaft was established, the student organisation of ‘Die 
Unbedingten’ (the Unconditional ones), also called ‘die Schwarzen’ (the Blacks), headed by the 
Follens, was beginning to emerge at Gießen. Initial efforts in the winter of 1814-15 around Karl’s 
‘Teutsche Lesegesellschaft zur Erreichung vaterländischer Zwecke’ were followed by a rapid 
succession of different student groups between 1815 and 1818, which in a process of radicalisation 
largely directed by the Follen brothers, continuously disbanded and reformed.8 They all shared the 
same republican, democratic outlook coupled with a  belief in the need for national unity and, 
increasingly, the necessity of militancy to achieve their political aims. 
Right from the beginnings of the ‘Lesegesellschaft’ the Follens’ organisations had a dress code: black 
velvet cloak, large (white) collar worn over the cloak, black velvet beret with a cross (worn on 
shoulder-length hair) and a small dagger.9 This gave them their nickname, the ‘(Gießener) 
Schwarzen’. The dress code was derived from early modern (German) clothing, from what they 
considered a ‘deutsche Volkstracht’ (German folk/national costume). This sartorial reference alluded 
to the period of the German Reformation, a key event in religious and political terms in the historical 
thinking of the contemporary movement for German national unity since Schiller and Fichte had 
styled it as a German achievement of national and world-historic significance in Aesthetic Education 
and Addresses to the German Nation respectively. The ‘Volkstracht’ also served to symbolise an 
egalitarian national dress. The Blacks’ secret sign was the acronym MHBG, which stood for the lines 
                                                          
6 For a summary cf. Oergel, ‘Burschenschaften’, pp. 65-68. 
7 Mehring, pp. 60-61. 
8 Mehring, pp. 37-42. 
9 Mehring, p. 40. 
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‘Im Herzen Muth, Trotz unterm Hut, am Schwerte Blut, macht alles gut’.10 Credited with being a 
slogan by Jahn,11 it appears as a quatrain under the title of the first section of Arndt’s Geist der Zeit II 
(1809/13).12 
The lines illustrate the committed militancy with which they approached their struggle, espousing 
violence and potential martyrdom. The notion of a holy war (‘heiliger Krieg’) was a common topos in 
the context of the Wars of Liberation. Theodor Körner invoked it in his poem ‘Aufruf’ in Leier und 
Schwert (1813),13 and Arndt used it in Landsturm und Landwehr (1813-15).14 Follen was certainly 
familiar with Körner’s poem,15 and it is more than likely that he knew Arndt’s pamphlet. A terrorist 
act soon followed – Karl Sand’s assassination of August von Kotzebue in March 1819. Sand had from 
1818 been a law student at Jena and has been directly linked to the Follens and the radical elements 
in Jena (and Gießen).16 Sand targeted Kotzebue because he considered him a supporter of a corrupt 
conservative regime. The ensuing Carlsbad Decrees made the Follens political criminals and drove 
them into exile.  
Follen saw the student organisations as prototype free states, governed publicly by the general will 
of their members/citizens. To this end he produced in 1816 a constitution for future student bodies, 
the Ehrenspiegel,17 which was to be the basis of the latest Gießen organisation under his auspices. 
This new body was a voluntary organisation, a student joins through an individual act of free will; it 
has democratic structures, decisions are made after public discussion by general (almost) secret vote 
and its officers are elected. Its legislative is based on ‘verfassungsmäßig ausgesprochenen 
Gemeinwillen’ (§3, ‘the constitutionally expressed general/public will’), and it was supposed to 
create, and act within, its own public sphere. Its judiciary is freely elected, but the identity of its 
members is kept secret. Follen summarises the activities of the new student movement in his 1819 
essay on universities. 
[Es] erhob sich unter den Burschen von Giessen das Urbild des christlichen deutschen Freistaats, wo 
bei voller Gleichheit der Ehrenhaften, der, in allgemeinen Burschenversammlungen durch freie, 
gemeinsame Verständigung hervorgebildete Gesamtwille in Burschensachen herrschte, und wo in 
engem Zusammenwirken aller judendlichen Kräfte, in Sitte und öffentlicher Meinung, ein gläubiges, 
volkstümliches Streben, ein wissenschaftliches, turnerisches, freibürgerliches Treiben, sich 
entfaltete.18 
                                                          
10 ‘Courage in my heart, Defiance under my hat, Blood on my sword, Makes everything good.’ Unless 
otherwise stated all translations are my own. 
11 Mehring, p. 40, based on Hermann Haupt, Karl Follen und die Giessener Schwarzen (Gießen: Tölpelmann, 
1907), p. 10. 
12 Geist der Zeit II, 1st 1809, 2nd edition (London: Boosey, 1813), p. 1. The first edition had a very small 
circulation and is exceedingly rare. As the 2nd edition contains ‘alternations’ (is ‘verändert’), it has not yet been 
possible to ascertain whether it appeared already in the 1809 edition, in which case it would precede the 
Turnbewegung, and Jahn may have picked it up from Arndt. 
13 Theodor Körner, ‘Aufruf’, l. 11, in Sämmtliche Werke, vol 1, 5th edition (Berlin: Grote, 1885), p. 15. 
14 Ernst Moritz Arndt, Was bedeutet Landsturm und Landwehr? (Cologne: Rommeskirchen, 1815), p. 16. ‘Der 
Krieg, der nicht für Raub und Eroberung geführt wird, sondern für das Vaterland und die Freiheit, ist ein 
heiliger Krieg.’ 
15 Mehring, p. 31. 
16 Mehring, pp. 70-79; Günther Heydemann, Karl Ludwig Sand: Die Tat als Attentat (Hof: Oberfränkische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1985), pp. 78-82. 
17 Karl Follen, ‘Ehrenspiegel der Burschenschaft zu Gießen’, in Between Natives and Foreigners. Selected 
Writing of Karl/Charles Follen (1796-1840), edited by Frank Mehring (Bern, New York: Peter Lang, 2007), pp. 3-
18. 
18 Karl Follen, ‘Beiträge zur Geschichte der teutschen Sammtschulen’, in Between Natives and Foreigners, pp. 
19-44 (p. 19). Among the Burschen (students) at Gießen there arose the vision of a Christian German free 
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A crucial aspect of the concept of liberty presented here is its legitimation by publicness; public 
debate and activity are to create public general spirit (Gesamtwille) and public opinion, which is 
based on majority decisions. However, individuals are free to make their own decisions; while they 
are governed by the laws they make, they are ultimately beholden only to their own conviction and 
the jurisdiction of their individual conscience, ‘nur so zu handeln, wie es Überzeugung und Gewissen 
gebietet’ (Ehrenspiegel, p. 4, to act only as one’s conviction and conscience demands). Clearly visible 
is the influence of the Lutheran priority of the individual’s conscience in a corrupt world, as well as 
the impact of Jakob Friedrich Fries’ ethics based on personal conviction. Fries was professor of 
Philosophy at Jena at the time and a key influence on the Burschenschaft movement.19 Non-
Christians and non-German students could attend the public discussions and debates and were 
allowed to raise objections and make observations, but could not vote or bring their own motions 
(Ehrenspiegel, §9, 10, 17a). 
In October 1817 the ‘Wartburgfest’, a gathering of these new Burschenschaften, brought the radical 
as well as moderate aspects of the student body to the fore, but confirmed that the general aim 
remained to drive forward the constitutional movement, which for most included a united Germany. 
That these political activities were by the conservative authorities considered political radicalism and 
associated with the Revolution is evident from the vocabulary used in connection with the 
Burschenschaften and Turner: the Wartburgfest was dubbed a new ‘storming of the Bastille’, 
Burschenschaftler were attacked as ‘Jacobins’, Jena was described as a ‘Jakobinernest’.20 
Follen did not attend, but a number of Gießen Blacks did. Follen was in the process of completing his 
law doctorate, and soon after the Wartburgfest took the next step in his efforts to bring about 
political change in Germany: together with this brother August he began working on a constitution 
for the new Germany, the ‘Grundzüge für eine Künftige Teutsche Reichsverfassung’, which was 
written in the winter of 1817-18.21 Perhaps politically the most radical German constitutional 
attempt of the time, an annotated draft is extant because it was secured as evidence by post-
Carlsbad surveillance agents. The ‘Reichsverfassung’ shares many features with the French 
Constitution of June 1793,22 the most radical of the French constitutions, which was ratified by the 
Convention, but never implemented, and discarded in 1795. 
Both are fully representative constitutions, i.e. based on popular sovereignty, which means the 
‘people’, which is comprised of the citizens, is the sovereign; Follen speaks of ‘des Volkes rechtliche 
Allmacht und Alleinmacht’ (§4, power resides fully and only in the people), the ‘Volk’ exercises 
‘gesetzgebende’, ‘richterliche und vollziehende Gewalt’ (§5, legislative, judicial and executive 
power). In similar vein, the 1793 Constitution states that ‘the sovereign people embraces the whole 
of French citizens’ (article 7) and ‘the population is the only basis of national representation’ (article 
21). This sovereignty is in both cases exercised by universal (male) suffrage through electing direct 
representatives. Both constitutions are based on the division of power; and both feature a pyramid 
                                                          
state, in which all (honourable) members are equal and where the general will, which has emerged in free 
communal agreement, rules all student affairs. In this state, where youthful vigour, moral customs (Sitte) and 
public opinion closely interact, a faithful, popular striving and intellectual and sporting activities developed 
among its free citizens. 
19 Cf. Gerald Hubmann, Überzeugungsethik und politisches Handeln. Jakob Friedrich Fries und die deutsche 
Tradition der Gesinnungsethik (Heidelberg: Winter, 1997). 
20 Cf. Heydemann, p. 73. 
21 ‘Grundzüge für eine Künftige Teutsche Reichsverfassung’, in Between Natives and Foreigners, pp. 45-57. 
22 As quoted on http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/1793-french-republic-constitution-of-1793 which is based on 
the edition by Francis Lieber in his On Civil Liberty and Self-Government, 1st 1853, 3rd revised edition, ed. by 
Theodore D. Woolsey (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1883). Franz Lieber was a German-American 
professor of history and political economy, a former Burschenschaftler, gymnast, and veteran of the Greek war 
of independence, who emigrated to the United States, arriving in Boston in 1827. 
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of democratic representative structures from local up to national level. Both provide for stringent 
measures to safeguard the integrity of this sovereignty by publicity and public-ness, using the 
regulative forces of the public sphere as the forum where the general will emerges. From these 
premises derive a number of shared features. 
The national assemblies of elected representatives, the Assemblée nationale23 and the Reichstag 
respectively, hold the legislative (and highest) power; they determine laws, the budget, war and 
peace, foreign relations, and they choose the executive. In both the function of the executive is 
conceived as purely administrative (article 65 in the 1793 Constitution; §25, 28 and 29 in 
‘Reichsverfassung’). The executive civil servants, such as executive administrators and the judiciary, 
are chosen by elected representatives. Both envisage a complex administrative organisation of the 
national territory to enable and safeguard popular sovereignty. Although administratively divided, 
the national territory is indivisible to ensure that the same laws apply to all citizens. Territorial 
national unity is seen as the precondition to guarantee anti-feudal and anti-absolutist government. 
Both share the same keen sense that governing must be public to ensure that power is not abused; 
hence, parliaments and the courts conduct their business in public (cf. article 45, 94, 96 and §8 
respectively), and there is a free press (§18 and article 122). All citizens are equal before the law 
(article 122 and §4), and both constitutions envisage general conscription (article 109 and §32). 
There can be little doubt that French ideas, as expressed in the 1793 constitution, inform Follens’ 
constitutional efforts. But there are also key differences. 
The Follen draft is much more detailed regarding how to ensure democratic consensus at all levels: it 
spells out how every resolution has to be presented and voted on from village to Reichstag, all levels 
have fora of discussion and decision-making, including decisions on all functionaries/officials 
(parishes can pass a vote of no confidence on their vicars, §11), even ‘die Gemeine ist ein Freistaat’ 
(§22, the parish is a free state), one of the many Follen envisaged existing and interlinking in the new 
Germany. But this is a difference of degree, not essence. 
In both constitutions the definition of citizenship is linked to the right to vote, which in fairly 
universal male suffrage involving all classes in participating in politics. Apart from allowing only male 
voters, both put some limitations on the franchise. The 1793 Constitution stipulates it should include 
every man who ‘lives from his labour’, specifies the necessary age (21), and focuses on a connection 
with France, i.e. born in France, married to a Frenchwoman, owning property in France, supporting 
an old (French) man, having adopted a (French) child. The ‘Künftige Reichsverfassung’ stipulates that 
anyone who is ‘unbescholten’ (without blame) and ‘wahrhaft gemacht’ (has identification) can be 
elected, while voters have to be ‘dies beides und ein Mann mit unabhängigem Hauswesen’ (§5, both 
without blame and have identification, and an independent household). This latter rather property-
based, middle class proviso is revoked in the marginalia, everyone who has achieved what is perhaps 
best described as civil maturity can vote: ‘Wähler und wählbar ist jeder Teutsche, der für seine 
eigentümliche Leibes- und Geistesbeschaffenheit, nach dem Urteil der Ärzte und der Schule, zum 
selbständigen Bürger ausgebildet, vor dem Volke wehrhaft und des Mitgenusses des heiligen 
Abendmahles teilhaftig gemacht worden ist.’24 The Follen constitution prominently uses the signally 
French terminology of citizenship. In their political capacity people are ‘Bürger’ and a male becomes 
adult when he reaches ‘bürgerliche Reife’ (civil maturity), which is certified by his teachers and 
medical professionals (§15). Only in the marginalia is the right to vote explicitly linked to being 
German (‘jeder Teutsche’). In the running text this is implicit, voters are members of the ‘Volk’, a 
term that connotes social as well as ethnic identities. Voters have to be members of the German 
‘Volk’, and their identity is defined culturally, as set out in §1-3, which define the German people: 
                                                          
23 The French National Conventions is to deal with matters of the constitution (articles 115-117). 
24 Cf. Amendment to §5, cf. Between Natives and Foreigners, p. 456. Every German can vote and be elected 
who has been certified by doctors and his school as being an independent citizen in accordance with his own 
individual physical and intellectual properties, who can carry arms and has partaken of Holy Communion. 
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they are characterised by a shared language (‘gleiche Sprache’), shared historical memory (‘gleiche 
geschichtliche Erinnerung’), and the same faith (‘gleicher Glaube’). §3 concludes: ‘Das Reich ist eine 
Vereinigung aller Teutschen.’ (The Reich is the union of all Germans.) In this emerges the key 
difference: the importance of cultural identity in the Follen draft. It is evident in three differences of 
essence between the ‘Künftige Reichsverfassung’ and the 1793 Constitution: the focus on religion, 
cultural history, and education. 
Religion. Follen’s German Free State is animated by a potentially ecumenical Christianity based on 
the teachings of Christ and the New Testament (§10), revealing its strongly Protestant roots and  
preaching freedom, truth and love (§11). It proposes a Christian state church, which is fully involved 
in promoting moral citizenship. The church has a democratic organization parallel to that of popular 
sovereignty. It is, however, not mandatory that a citizen attends (this) church regularly, everybody is 
free to follow other (Christian?) denominations ‘Glaubenszwang ist überall nicht’ (religious coercion 
does not exist) and the ‘Hausandacht ist ungestört’ (private devotion is undisturbed at home). The 
Christianity Follen envisages has (some) features of a universal humanism. Religions that are ‘den 
Zwecken der Menschheit zuwider’ (contrary to the purpose of humanity) will not be tolerated. 
Judaism, however, is specifically excluded. The 1793 Constitution makes no provision for the 
influence or inclusion of religion or the church in the processes of exercising popular sovereignty or 
public life. Religion only features under ‘rights’: its free exercise is guaranteed (article 122). One is 
tempted to wonder to what extent this is linked to the fact that there was no established 
(Protestant) tradition of religious dissent in France, and as such no politically viable ‘dissenting’ 
tradition, onto which a new political vision could be projected, as was the case in 16th-century 
Germany and 17th-century England. In France the Catholic Church was fully implicated in the 
absolutism of the ancien régime, hence perhaps the emphasis is on a fully secular constitution. 
Education. The fundamental importance of general education is evident in Follen’s definition of 
citizenship: attending (a free comprehensive) school is considered essential for attaining citizenship 
maturity, it is mandatory between the ages of 8-16 (§12). The structure of the national education 
system (schools and universities) is presented in similar detail as that of the church;25 both schools 
and universities are to be the training grounds of democracy and citizenship, they are themselves 
Freistaaten. The 1793 Constitution does not discuss education or a school system, it only mentions 
the ‘right’ to ‘general instruction’ (article 122). 
The last key difference is the historically constructed cultural identity (and possibly historically 
constructed ethnicity). ‘Teutsche sind ein Volk.’ (§1, Germans are one people). This is based on 
shared language, historical memory, and Christianity. These three features are becoming fairly 
standard cultural markers used in the broader (German and British) discussions of the time to 
identify a modern European identity and within this, modern national identities.26 These discussions 
of cultural identity are also intricately related to the debates about how to define new social 
collectives and how to enfranchise them.27 In this discourse historical memory sometimes 
                                                          
25 The subjects to be taught in school are prescribed, and balanced between academic and vocational subjects; 
they are to be chosen according to ability, inclination, and the pupil’s potential future choice of profession 
(ibid.) The society Follen envisages is a meritocracy, with career progress based on ability and qualifications. 
26 Cf. Maike Oergel, ‘Germania and Grea(ter) Britain: German Scholarship and the Legitimization of the British 
Empire’ in Angermion. Yearbook of Anglo-German Cultural Relations 5 (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 2012), pp. 
91-118; and ‘”Germanisierung” als romantisches Kulturmuster in der englischen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. 
Jahrhunderts’, in Praxis und Diskurs der Romantik 1800-1900, edited by Norman Kasper and Jochen Strobel 
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 2016), pp. 99-116. 
27 ‘The Germanic and the Gothic. Creating an Identity of Northern Liberty and Communal Responsibility to 
enfranchise a New Collective’ in Maike Oergel. Zeitgeist. How Ideas travel. Politics, Culture and the Public in the 
Age of Revolution, forthcoming 2018. 
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foregrounds the Reformation, sometimes aspects of medieval culture. One might hesitate to call 
Follen’s identity constructions purely ethnic, as the draft does not state that membership depends 
on German blood (whatever that may be), although being ‘German’ in terms of language and 
historical memory was a key factor. The 1793 Constitution also explicitly acknowledges that being 
French by birth bestows citizenship, although it spells out clearly that this right is easily acquired by 
those not born in France (article 4). It also makes no conditions regarding cultural identity based on 
language, history, or religion. It does, however, make claims on its citizens’ political persuasions: the 
rights of French citizenship are forfeit if the citizen accepts ‘offices of state, or favours which do not 
proceed from a democratic government’ (article 4). The focus on cultural identity is the key 
difference between German and Western European concepts of citizenship, it has been taken as 
evidence that German political thinking lacks the influence of rationalistic natural law. 
Is the lack of influence of natural law the only reason for these shifts? Why was the German 
‘Jacobinical’ popular sovereign underpinned by religion and shared historical culture, which is 
inculcated by (moral and political) education? The focus on education is drawn from the 
preoccupations of the preceding generation, especially Schiller, Fichte, and Humboldt. Follen had 
read Fichte, whose Reden an die deutsche Nation had legendary status among the anti-Napoleonic 
freedom fighters, and he was a huge Schiller-fan. Both Schiller and Fichte wrote their education 
plans in response to the Revolution and its consequences, Schiller under the impression of the 
events of 1793, Fichte reacting to the developments after 1806. 
These education plans, outlined in Schiller’s Aesthetic Education and Fichte’s Addresses, are in both 
cases their authors’ responses to the ‘failure’ of the French Revolution, which both of them had 
initially welcomed enthusiastically. For both it was a failure in terms of France descending into the 
despotic tyranny of party politics and intense factionalism. Both concluded that the French had not 
been ready for revolutionary social and political upheaval because they lacked the moral preparation 
for this. Such preparation was provided, according to Schiller and Fichte, by the implementation of 
the ideas of the Reformation. I see this as their determined attempt to ‘save’ the ambitions of the 
Revolution. The cultivation of an independent conscience and moral responsibility had to come first, 
before a morally mature, free citizen can emerge who can shoulder the political responsibility of 
popular sovereignty and the liberation from hierarchical structures which oppress the people, but 
which also establish order. In short: moral reformation has to precede political revolution. This is 
exactly what Follen demands. 
For both Fichte and Schiller Luther’s Reformation is the starting point for making such an education 
possible, and it is a project which needs to continue. This explains the role of Protestant Christianity 
in shaping able citizens in Follen’s political plans. It is linked to the notion of inner conviction – 
Überzeugung – which must inform moral action, and which was establishing itself as the basis of 
political action at this time, when the Jena professor of philosophy Jakob Friedrich Fries adapted 
Kant’s moral philosophyfor practical political action. Fries was one of the ‘political Jena 
professoriate’, he addressed the students at the Wartburgfest and is likely to have influenced, or 
confirmed, Follen’s thinking in this context.28 
The connection with an ‘indigenous’ event (the Reformation) and tradition (Christianity) anchored 
the revolutionary liberation process in historical progress and gave it a trajectory. Follen’s martial 
poem, Großes Lied, makes explicit the link between Luther’s liberation movement and the objectives 
of the current liberation movement, spearheaded by the students: ‘Luther, das freie Blut’ was ‘Die 
Geißel der Hohen’ (scourge of the upper classes) and ‘Der Wahrheit Flammberg, der Taten Dolch’ 
                                                          
28 Cf. Hubmann, Ethische Überzeugung. 
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(the flaming mountain of truth, the dagger of activism).29 The Wartburgfest itself was explicitly 
making this link. In the place where Luther translated the Bible into the German vernacular while in 
hiding from his imperial and papal persecutors, the students gathered in October 1817 to 
commemorate both the fourth anniversary of the Battle of Leipzig, i.e. the Wars of Liberation  
(October 1813) and the 300th of Luther nailing his theses to the church door in not too distant 
Wittenberg (October 1517).  
Follen’s Lied suggests that he was intending to bring about a German revolution that would violently 
overthrow the existing structures of rule, abolish all hereditary rights and all forms of unchecked 
exercise of political power in a way that is clearly modelled on the course of the Revolution in 
France. The different parts of the ‘Lied’ were written around the same time as the draft constitution 
and were circulating in 1818. It shares many features with Körner’s poetry, especially the focus on 
the willing acceptance of patriotic martyrdom, the glorification and transubstantiation of violence in 
battle and the fervent denunciation of the enemy as evil, all markers of a holy war. Körner, invoking 
Schiller, presents the conflict as in tyrannos, fighting tyrants, but only very occasionally hints at 
restructuring (German) social power.30 Follen on the other hand is clearly suggesting a struggle for 
popular sovereignty when he speaks of ‘Volkesmacht’ (p. 58, the power of the people) and the need 
to restore ‘Volksfreiheit’ (p. 59, the freedom of the people). This can only be achieved by a violent 
revolution which will kill both despotic rulers and their servile slaves: ‘Hin auf Knecht und 
Zwingherrn, die dich hudeln,/ Sei ein Volk, ein Freistaat’ (p. 60) or ‘Tod des Herrn wie des Knechtes/ 
Fordert der Engel des Menschengeschlechts’ (p. 69).31 The notion of universal human as well as civil 
rights is never far from the surface. The poem is anti-monarchic and anti-divine right: ‘Stürzt um die 
vergötterte Schande;/ Von dem Throne die Fürsten/ In Flammen den Thron’ (p. 69).32 It rejects 
despotic royal and clerical authority in favour of a new collective: ‘Fort Zwingherrn-, Adel- und 
Pfaffenbrut/ Soldaten und Pöbel zur Höllenglut!/ Ein Reich freier Bürger,/ Ein Gott, Ein Volk, Ein 
Wille soll sein,/ Doch die Menschheit im Volke nur schafft den Verein.’ (p. 68)33 Violence is 
inevitable, condoned, and embraced: ‘Dann wird’s, dann bleibt’s nur gut. […] Wenn du Gewehr und 
Axt,/ Schlachtbeil und Sense packst,/ Zwingherrn den Kopf abhackst,/ Brenn, alter Mut!’ (p. 62).34 
The wording clearly recalls the motto MHBG. This is necessary because: ‘Schlagt euer Plager tot,/ 
Rettet das Land!’ (p. 62) and ‘Eine Menschheit zu retten aus Knechtschaft und Wahn,/ Zur Blutbühn, 
zum Rabenstein führt unsere Bahn.’ (p. 64)35 The Lied (and the constitution) are clearly situated in a 
post-Napoleonic political landscape: liberation from French occupation has been achieved, but not 
from the ‘ancien régime’, reinstated by the Congress of Vienna. This is why the ‘Volk’s military 
struggle has to turn into militant struggle to throw off its German oppressors: that is to say, its 
despotic, oppressive and illegitimate rulers. 
                                                          
29 Between Natives and Foreigners, pp. 58-71 (p. 68). What is printed in Mehring’s edition is the entire 
collection of all  parts, each with individual titles, that were circulating at the time under the name of ‘Großes 
Lied’, Mehring, pp. 440-441.  
30 As in ‘Aufruf’, the holy war is ‘kein Krieg, von dem die Kronen wissen’, l. 10 (no war of which the crowned 
heads/the monarchies know’. Körner is mostly supportive of monarchical rule in a united Germany, eulogising 
the Prussian and Austrian eagles (symbols of crowned rule), patriotic kingship, and the Prussian Queen Luise. 
31 ‘Bring down slaves and slave masters, who treat you ill, be a nation, be a free state’ and ‘the angel of the 
human race demands the death of masters and slaves’. 
32 ‘overthrow the icons of shame, princes off their thrones, thrones into the flames’ 
33 ‘To hell with the princes, to hell with the spawn of the aristocracy and clerics, away with (hired) soldiers and 
scum, One Reich of free citizens, one God, one people, one will shall be, only the people’s  humanity creates 
the union.’ 
34‘It will only be right and succeed if you grab gun and axe and butcher’s knife and scythe and hack off the 
slave master’s head. Burn, ancient courage!’ 
35 ‘Bludgeon those that torment you to death, Save the country!’ ‘In order to save humanity from slavery and 
madness, our path leads to the scaffold, to the Raven’s Stone.’ 
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The ‘Schwarzens’’ dress code was designed to recall and legitimate their historical trajectory, it is 
early modern, puritanical, and protestant, and so is to some extent the language used in the orbit of 
Follen’s agitation activities. While the  ‘Künftige Reichsverfassung’ and the Ehrenspiegel (excepting 
its name) are both largely written in contemporary legal German, Follen’s language does not only in 
his propagandistic poems hark back to early modern German, but also in his summary of the recent 
student movements, where he speaks of ‘Sammtschule’, ‘Wahlfeld von Leipzig’, ‘das Kreuzschwert 
der Freiheit’.36 This is not specifically a Follen trait, but common to the radical liberal-democratic 
nationalists, e.g. Turner circles. 
This harking back to an imagined important and legitimising national past has been summarised as 
Deutschtümelei (Teutomania), and criticised then37 and later. It has been widely seen as evidence of 
the politically immature, backward and illiberal nature of German nationalism, and an innate racism, 
the harbinger of worse to come.38 For Follen the language and the ‘altdeutsche Tracht’ were a 
political statement - he prescribes ‘allgemeine Volkstracht’ to be worn at official occasions (voting, 
law courts etc) in the constitution (§19) – presumably to legitimate progressive politics that 
enfranchised a broad sweep of citizens in a way that did not imitate current, discredited 
representations of power. And the challenge was understood as such by conservatives. Steiger 
claims that conservative authorities saw the ‘Altdeutsche Tracht’ as a ‘German version of the clothes 
of the sans-culottes’.39 To what extent Follen is credited with being a fore-fighter for German 
democracy, or inversely considered a radical Jacobin, has tended to depend on the interpretation of 
the Teutomanic tendencies in his texts.40 
In many respects, Deutschtümelei was a model exercise in imaginary identity-building, which Follen 
clearly felt was necessary to constitute the collective sovereign of German popular sovereignty. This 
sovereign was not as evident as, for example, its French counterpart, geographically or politically at 
least. Follen felt it needed stating in §1 that, ‘Teutsche sind ein Volk’, that they are ‘gleichartig’ (§2) 
in terms of cultural heritage and choice of religion. The Follen constitution goes to considerable 
length to accommodate regional diversity, recognising the federal nature of the old Reich, and 
perhaps also its soft borders.41 
Modern Essentialist Identities: Follen and Fanon 
In its fundamentalist essentialism Deutschtümelei shares some features with the identity 
construction familiar from the colonial liberation struggles, perhaps initially especially with the 
négritude movement of Pan-Africanism from the 1930s to 1950s, which also focused on a recovery 
of historical roots to create an identity that has the strength to inspire resistance and insurgency, as 
well as a new polity, and which prioritised ethnic culture, if not ethnicity per se, as the key criterion 
                                                          
36 ‘Geschichte der teutschen Sammtschulen seit dem Freiheitskriege’, p. 19. 
37 Cf. Saul Ascher, Die Germanomanie. Skizze zu einem Zeitgemählde (Berlin: Achenwall und Comy, 1815). 
38 There are totalitarian and anarchic tendencies: the ‘ethics of conviction’ liberate from all external law. Also 
see their motto (MHBG), which is violent and rebellious without clear content. 
39 Steiger, p. 55, ‘deutsche Abart der Sansculotten Tracht’ . 
40 Cf. Grab, who sees it as an ‘eigentümliche Vermengung progressiver and reaktionärer Tendenzen’ (p. 498); 
Steiger, a GDR academic, in 1967 stressed the progressive aims and intentions of the students and saw the 
Teutomania in this light (pp. 33-57), for him ‘aggressive nationalism and chauvinism’ were a product of the 
time after 1849 and linked to reactionary German imperialism’ (p. 57). The editors of Blut und Paukboden, on 
the other hand, explicitly place the entire movement within ‘Konservatismus’, identifying it as part of the 
continuity of ‘anti-democratic thinking’. Blut und Paukboden. Eine Geschichte der Burschenschaften, edited by 
Dietrich Heiter, Michael Gehler, Alexandra Kurth, Gerhard Schäfer (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1997), p. 12. 
41 Cf. §2 and p. 456 for amendments. Regarding the ‘soft’ borders, the draft also includes the Swiss, Alsacians 
and Frisians, which could be read as a großdeutsch land-grab. But it is significant in this context that he talks 
about people (‘Schweizer, Elsässer, und Friesen’), not territories, which could suggest he is thinking of 
voluntary, possibly individual accession. 
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for inclusion.42 It also (albeit on a more global scale) dealt with an identity without a clear territory, 
let alone a state, and without a clearly defined ‘people’. 
For négritude, black identity rests on culture, and the awareness of cultural identity will lead to a 
changed politics. Focused on black culture in its original and indigenous state, it has recourse to ‘the 
centers of African civilizations, their religious systems, their forms of government, their artistic 
wealth’, which is opposed to an oppressive, exploitative, and decadent white culture.43 In his essay 
‘African Negro Aesthetics’ Léopold Sédar Senghor proclaimed that ‘Emotion is Negro, reason is 
Hellenic’.44 This presents an approach to cultural identity in which historically organic identity is 
given essentialist qualities. Senghor’s statement has remained controversial, and he frequently had 
occasion to explain it. Négritude, and especially Senghor, have been criticised for essentialism.45 
Somewhat ironically in our context, Senghor’s point is also aimed against a French hegemony, and in 
cultural and intellectual terms especially against the analytical type of rationality, or ‘French (neo-
)classical reason’. Essentialism is still present, a generation later, in Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the 
Earth (1962). Although it is now critically mediated, it still comes with a focus on national culture. 
Fanon also engages with the use of violence to liberate the nation. ‘National liberation, national 
reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or Commonwealth […], decolonization is 
always a violent event.’46 
Fanon is critical of the universalism of Pan-African négritude, which for him negates the differences 
created by different concrete historical situations inhabited by U.S. blacks or blacks in Africa, 
struggling for or with their independence. He is dismissive of the intellectual talking about ‘”Negro-
African” culture’, directly alluding to Senghor, which to him only reflects a white colonial 
construction of colonised people (168-170). Fanon insists on a more specific national identity and 
culture. He recognises ‘organic’ national identities as constructed, but this does not prevent him 
from recognising their efficacy and deploying them. ‘All the men and women fighting French 
colonialism in Algeria with their bare hands, are no strangers to the national culture of Algeria. The 
Algerian national culture takes form and shape during the fight.’ (168) 
There are two similarities to Follen’s approach: firstly, Fanon, too, proposes to revitalise a buried and 
belittled national culture of the past in order to create a specific and inspiring identity. Historical 
precedents, especially heroic deeds, are to be made relevant to the current situation. And secondly 
he also establishes a link between the cultural identity and committed militant activism to liberate 
an oppressed and colonised homeland in order to establish a fairer participatory political (and 
economic) system.  
When the colonized intellectual writing for his people uses the past he must do so with the intention 
of opening up the future, of spurring them into action and fostering hope. But in order to secure 
hope, in order to give it substance, he must take part and commit himself body and soul to the 
national struggle. […] To fight for national culture first of all means fighting for the liberation of the 
nation, the tangible matrix from which culture can grow. One cannot divorce the combat for culture 
from the people’s struggle for liberation. […] We must work and struggle in step with the people. […] 
                                                          
42 The essay on négritude in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/negritude/) accessed February 2018, outlines how the definition of Black 
African culture formed the basis for a counter-identity to white culture. In the publications of the late 1940s it 
was especially literature, from poetry to essay-writing, that was seen as establishing this identity, was 
necessary to achieve liberation. 
43 Cf. ibid, quoting from Jane Nardal’s article ‘Internationalisme noir’ of 1928. 
44 Written in 1939, the essay was published in 1956 in Diogenes (vol 4, issue 4). 
45 The most famous critique is perhaps Sartre’s label of ‘anti-racist racism’ (‘Orphée noir’, prefatory essay to 
Senghor’s Anthologie de la nouvelle poésie négre et malgache, 1948). 
46 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, translated by Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2004), p. 1. 
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National culture is the collective thought process of a people to describe, justify and extol [chanter, 
to sing] the actions whereby they have joined forces and remained strong. National culture in the 
underdeveloped countries, therefore, must lie at the very heart of the liberation struggle. (pp. 167-
168) 
Similar to Follen, Fanon advocates a dedication to a total war against the oppressor based on an 
identity driven by historical collective popular culture, expressed here in inspiring national poetry. 
Historicism alone is not enough, it must be coupled with militant activism. National literature 
becomes ‘combat literature’, ‘it calls upon a whole people to join the struggle for the existence of 
the nation’ (173).47 The result is a meshing of military and militant struggle, inspired by a separatist 
identity and turning to partisan-terrorist warfare. ‘In a colonized country nationalism in its most 
basic, rudimentary and undifferentiated form is the most forceful and effective way of defending 
national culture.’ (p. 177) It has the aim to restore ‘national sovereignty’ (p. 178). Follen appears to 
have thought along similar lines. The impetus of the militant struggle of the Wars of Liberation, the 
democratic (‘Jacobin’) political opposition in Germany overlapped with the construction of a popular 
national culture in a not dissimilar way. For Fanon the liberation of territory is essential for building a 
new society in a new state: one of ‘our fundamental tasks […] is to liberate the national territory’. (p. 
170) 
In a notable difference to Follen, however, Fanon describes the re-assimilation, and re-immersion, of 
especially the colonised intellectual into the ‘people’, complete with authentic language and 
clothing, with considerable ironic distance. 
The flowing dress of the boubou is regarded as sacred and the shoes from Paris or Italy are shunned 
for babouches. The language of the colonizer suddenly scorches his lips. Rediscovering one’s people 
sometimes means in this phase […] going as native as possible.’ (p. 158) 
The features of the process Fanon describes are however the same as Follen’s ‘altdeutsche Tracht’ 
and the Luther-esque language of his songs. Fanon may be ironising the unreflected Romantic 
exoticism of the first generation of négritude – which seems to equate with Follen’s - but it remains 
to him an essential stage of development towards the militant activism that will liberate both 
territory and culture. 
Oral literature, tales, epics, popular songs, previously classified and frozen in time, begin to change. 
[…] it becomes an authentic form of entertainment that once again has cultural value. Colonialism 
knows full well what it was doing when it began systematically arresting these storytellers after 
1955. (p. 174) 
So did the conservative authorities after 1819. Follen’s Großes Lied was circulating in radical student 
groups; Sand incorporated parts of it into a pamphlet he distributed in October 1818, which was 
directly aimed at the ‘teutsche Menge’, the German lower-class masses.48 
There are evident differences between the oppression associated with colonialism and that 
associated with either French occupation and political control over Europe between 1806 and 1813 
or the Restauration after 1815. But there are similarities between Follen and Fanon, who both as 
intellectuals and as highly qualified professionals worked to create popular collective identities, 
based on national culture, that would help inspire the overthrow of an oppressive and exploitative 
system. The pattern of their resistance, in which the spirit of violated historical identity animates a 
violent struggle to liberate territory and establish a fair and participatory state, is similar, which – 
bearing in mind the differences regarding place and time – could suggest that this is a generic 
                                                          
47 Cf. ‘Schlagt eure Plager tot, Rettet das Land!’ above. 
48 Cf. Mehring, pp. 76-77. 
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pattern. To what extent one is prepared to accept that the oppression Follen was fighting was 
sufficiently similar to the one Fanon was facing is open to debate. It must however be clear that 
Follen saw the situation as desperate and extreme, that he perceived a state of unbridgeable 
difference between the rulers and their party, and the ‘people’. 
One might be inclined to consider the situation of the German subjects of 1806, 1815 or 1820 not in 
the same category of ‘oppressed-ness’ as that of coloured colonised subjects. But it is worth more 
research to investigate whether there are subtle similarities between how colonised black people in 
the twentieth century and disenfranchised Germans around 1800, and especially between 1806 and 
1820, saw themselves in terms of lacking cultural and political self-determination. 
This takes me back to the nexus between the nation, the people, and freedom, and its crux: the 
popular sovereign which embodies the general will, and which exercises its freedom by doing so. 
This is a question of who can be enfranchised, socially, economically, but also ‘culturally’. Who is of 
the people? If borders are stable and supported by visible cultural and linguistic demarcation, 
delineating ‘the people’ can be relatively straightforward. But if borders are changing and arbitrary, 
which is a common feature in central Europe and in the colonial world or in a diaspora, identity is 
harder to formulate, and tends to be defined by a mix of culture, tradition, and ethnicity. This is 
especially the case if there is a perception of unwanted domination and if there are reasons why 
assimilation with the dominant power is not easily possible. 
Follen may well have seen a connection between disenfranchised Germans and black slaves. In 1824 
his exile in Switzerland, where he was holding an academic post at the University of Basel, was no 
longer safe, and he was forced to emigrate to the United States. He settled in Boston and from the 
late 1820s built up German teaching at a nascent Harvard; from 1830 he held the first chair of 
German language and literature in the United States, at Harvard. In 1835, however, his tenure was 
not renewed, largely because he had meanwhile developed into a vociferous abolitionist, 
considering slavery a betrayal of the promise of the American constitution, and a ‘free’ America, 
which he had embraced with great fervour at this arrival in the new world, and on the occasion of 
his naturalisation. Follen’s embrace of the abolitionist cause, his insistence on the equality of black 
Americans as citizens, must throw a different light on the ethnic aspect of his ‘Teutomania’. It would 
appear to be rooted in his belief in the cultural foundation of enfranchised human collectives, not 
simply in supremacist racism. 
